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The work in the area of microfinance has concentrated on the issue of transaction costs
in delivering the financial services to the poor. However, the mechanisms of reducing
transaction costs have been mostly in the area of building trusts within local
communities and using trust as an effective surrogate for sorting the twin problems of
inadequate information and high cost of transactions.
The paper presents a theoretical framework to study the field of microfinance from this
point of view. There has been significant literature both in Economics as well as in
Behavioural Sciences in examining the role of trust in organisational settings. This
paper postulates that the element could be extended to networks like self-help groups.
Eventually, it tries to identify some thresholds where the concept of trust and social
capital can be used as a surrogate to reduce transaction-documentation costs and when
the costs become indifferent to the underlying trust in exchanges.
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The main objective of the working paper series of IIMA is to help faculty
members to test out their research findings at the pre-publication stage.2
Information Assymetry and Trust:
A framework for studying micro-finance in India
M S Sriram
The edifice of intermediation in financial services sector offers the following services.
1.  It helps individuals to plan their differing needs of finance at differing points in
time by an intervention that helps to balance.  In essence the intermediation offers
a mechanism of meeting the demand for finances of a person by the person's own
supply.  This is done by putting away some money (savings) to be used at a future
point in time or using the money in the current point with a promise to replace it in
future (loans).  In either case - the service of intermediation is usually used to
manage the time differences.
2.  There are several individuals who have these time differences, and the differences
across persons are not uniform. Therefore, there is a case where some persons are
savers and have no current needs for money and borrowers, who have a current
need for money to be met from future savings, or to be taken away from past
savings. Thus there is a demand and supply situation where one could get/pay a
price for the difference in timing. This creates opportunities for transaction
between people.
3.  Since full information about who is willing to supply money and who is willing to
borrow is not easily available, there is assymetry. A person might have greater
amount of information about the needs and reliability of a small circle of people
with whom s/he might have regular dealings. But that small circle might not
always be enough to take care of the demand supply gap. So there is a need to
expand this pool of people with whom the exchange could be carried out. In case
the exchanges are carried out with unknown people, there is further information
required before the exchange could happen - will the exchange contracts be
honoured? If they are not honoured, how could the contracts be enforced? Who in
the larger pool of people needs/can supply money and how reliable are they? This
gap invites intermediation.
So, intermediation bridges the timing gap within the person's own cash flows, it
bridges the gap between the differing need for money at the same time and bridges the
gap on reliability and trust to enable exchanges with unknown people.3
Banking and financial service institutions intermediate by providing a bridge for the
information assymetry in the market. The institutions get a fee for managing this
assymetry and managing the risk arising out of the assymetry - this fee is usually the
differential between what they pay for savers and what they get from lenders. In India
the intermediation system has emerged in response to some failure of the market.
Firstly, the rural economy is predominantly agrarian. So most of the cash inflow for
individuals is seasonal - around harvest time. Even non-farm incomes sometimes tend
to depend on agricultural income with smoother peaks - consider annual payments
made in the form of cereals and pulses to the washerman and the barber. Though
barter transactions may be reducing over a period of time, it cannot be denied the
overall availability of cash in the system tends to be seasonal where 70% of the
population are dependent on this stream of income. This one time income has to be
smoothened out till the next harvest.
This means forgoing current lump sum cash for a future regular cash flow. There are
not many outlets for this. Even if exchanges happen without intermediation, the
exchanges are fraught with risks because the saver is not sure that s/he would get the
inflow when needed. This is because the counter party could also be a creature of the
agrarian economy and has seasonal inflows and might not have the liquidity to honor
the commitments when it falls due.  The second part of the risk is that because of the
nature of uncertainty involved with agricultural output - in terms of yield and price,
the counter party might just not be able to honor the commitments even if the
intention is to honor. Thirdly, the residual amounts available from individuals - either
for saving upward or for loan repayment on a periodic basis are very small for any
direct exchange between individuals. It cannot go on unless there is some pooling. All
these elements - seasonality, uncertainty and scale make these exchanges without
intermediation almost impossible.
Institutional Intermediation
Firstly, there have been not many organised avenues or products designed to address
the savings needs of the rural people. There are not many savings products that4
address the seasonal needs of income and regular expenses - saving in lumpsum and
withdrawing throughout the year. There have also not been many products that
encourage collection of small residual sums on a daily basis. While there have been
several attempts in the past like the Syndicate Bank's Pygmy deposits, nothing has
been available on a large scale and on a sustained basis.  Part of the reason might be
the very high transaction costs that might be involved in managing the risk and
logistics of handling small savings.  So there have been instances where rural people
use savings agents to pool in small savings on a regular basis to just collect back the
principal at the end of a given time period - thereby not earning any fee for foregoing
current cash inflows for future inflows. Rutherford (2000) lists instances where the
savers actually make an out-of-pocket payment to get this service.
Secondly on the supply side there has been a lot of attempts made by state run
institutions to understand and tap the potential in the market.  The success rate of
institutional intermediation on the supply side has been varying. The All India Debt
and Investment Survey indicates a drastic increase in the role of institutional
intermediation in the decades of 60s and 70s and a gradual decline in the past two
decades (GOI, 1997). But still institutional intermediation in the debt market still
occupies a significant position. However, this intermediation has addressed the issue
in a skewed manner - because of schematic, targeted lending programmes depending
heavily on externally determined scale of finance and subsidies. The institutional
lending programmes have not been designed to foster trust, thereby increasing the
transaction costs in the process.
The Role of Trust in Exchanges
Trust has a significant role to play in the various forms of exchanges that happen in
the financial markets. There has been some attempts in the past to look at various
levels and the scope of trust and its effects on defining relationships in terms of
economic exchange (Humphrey and Schmitz, 1996). We would see later, that the
lesser the trust, the greater would be the transaction costs. Fukuyama (1995) discusses
the matter in great detail in his seminal work on Trust. He says that “..the
communities do not require extensive contract and legal regulation of their relations
because prior moral consensus gives members of the group a basis for mutual trust.”5
He further argues that “..legal apparatus, serving as a substitute for trust entails what
economists call ‘transaction costs’. Widespread distrust in society in other words
imposes a kind of tax on all forms of economic activity...”
Table 2-1 gives a brief description of the various types of institutions and a
broadbrush picture of the level of trust and resultant transaction costs. We illustrate
the role of trust and/or information and its effect on transaction costs in two different
scenarios to take this point further. In most parts we would be talking only about the
lending activity of rural institutions because savings products have never been the
focus of these institutions involved in financial intermediation in the rural areas.
Savings if any has only been incidental.
Firstly we consider the Indian scenario where there was a significant increase in the
role of formal institutions following the All India Rural Credit Survey of 1954 to a
declining role in the decades of 80s and 90s. This decline of formal lending
institutions has seen a concurrent (though not matching) growth of informal self-help
groups taking charge of the savings and credit needs of rural India. The overall role of
self-help groups is still not as significant as the formal credit, but over the past two
decades we have seen a significant growth in this sector.
What explains this change in role?  As we can see the early decades exhibited a
significant interest of the State in the arena of rural credit.  The first fivel year plan
had a thrust on agriculture and later at every stage, the state was concerned about how
the poor and marginal sections of the population are being serviced in terms of loans.
Integrated Rural Development Program was one of the largest poverty alleviation
programmes that targeted the rural poor.
Table-1 About here.
The Role of Intermediary Institutions in Fostering or Breaking Trust: Its Impact
on Exchanges
In essence the State was intervening in a market which was believed to be seeking
excessive return because of information asymmetry and trust. The state-sponsored
programmes was a signal of trust in the ability of the poorer sections of the society as6
being bankable. However there was a huge "subsidy" involved in the programme -
both in terms of interest rates which was much lower than the prevailing market rates
and a subsidy for the underlying asset bought out of the loan. This was a clear
invitation for rent seeking by the channels, leading to corruption. As long as the
subsidies continued, there did not seem to be a problem about the transaction costs
because the increased leakage was in some way buffered up the State subsidy.
However, it certainly was eroding the basic tenet of honouring all the clauses of a
contract. This meant that even when there was no information asymmetry, the
available information was not used in the best interest of the sustainability of the
system. It was an artificially propped up system that was to collapse when the
subsidies were removed and the transaction costs became real.
While this erosion of trust was happening in the formal system, there were other
systematic breaches in the contracts. The breach of trust was happened in small
amounts by small instances of waiver of penal interest.  It was followed by instances
of waiver of interest on loans and later with the waiver of the loans itself, thereby
rewarding and making a clean slate of parties who had breached the trust in the first
place and penalising parties who had honoured the trust.  This was a sure recipe for
erosion of any trust in the system.
However, by the time this happened, the people in general were exposed to
institutional intermediation. So with a little bit of intervention, it was possible to the
poor to see the necessity for exchanges through mechanisms of intermediation if the
transactions had to be sustainable in the long run.  Also there had to be adequate
compensation for exchanges and self-help groups and other microfinance institutions
came in to fill in the institutional gap left by the formal institutions. In the process, it
is possible that people who were not exposed to formal institutional intermediation
also got initiated in the process.
Figure 1 About Here
The new generation microfinance institutions are essentially addressing the problem
on the basis of mutuality - sorting out local demand-supply gaps locally and going out
of the local orbit for incremental or residual needs. This model uses the information7
available to the best possible uses and gets trust as a major factor back into
circulation. There are various variations of how information-trust is used in
microfinance institutions as we shall see later, but there is no doubt that wherever
there is ready information, that is being used to reduce transaction exchanges and
costs thereof. Over a period of time, aspects such as repeat transactions and
documentation are building up institutional memory.
One of the critical elements in fostering trust and information sharing is the relative
degree of certainty that the relationship is going be sustainable over a period of time.
If the relationship is going to be terminal, then each of the parties would resort to
strategic behavior and would never find a reason to foster trust.
Evidence of using trust to reduce transaction costs are reflected in the level and extent
of documentation that is done. In case of several self-help group and co-operative
group movements, it is possible that the transaction costs which are kept low initially
because of informality and access to information is no longer feasible when the
movement grows. The necessary element of growth and formalising the systems is
increase in transaction costs and developing mechanisms of institutional memory. In a
counter example we see how over a period of maturity the nature and role of
intermediation itself could change when the type of information availability changes.
It might be interesting to look at what happens to this relationship in mature societies,
where the fiscal discipline has not been affected by external intervention by the state.
For this we take an instance of the Desjardins Movement of Canada (Sriram, 2000).
In case of the movement, the initial stages started off very much like the model for
new generation institutions listed in Figure 2-2. In order to ensure that information
about the member/borrower is available in a scenario where the group itself was
growing bigger over a period of time, there was a credit committee formed. The
members of the committee were expected to have information about the borrowers
from their area and therefore bridged the information asymmetry to a large extent.
Over a period of time, due to the growth of technology and competition, two things
happened. The members started getting several alternative institutional intermediaries
to bridge the saving-borrowing gap. So there were channels for savings and
borrowings with the maturing market. However, the information at the disposal of the8
credit committee members started shrinking - because transactions could be done off
site, could be done at various outlets and with various agencies. Did it affect the
"trust" in the system. Quite the contrary. Now, due to technology, member behavior
was available on the machine in the form of credit history and behaviour. So the credit
committee was in any case becoming redundant.
Figure 2 About here.
Not only this, there was more happening due to revolution in information technology.
Information on alternatives for lending and borrowing was available without
intermediation of a bank-like institution. Savers could directly invest in equity.
Corporations directly borrowed from the retail market, thereby paying less than what
they would pay to the bank and also increasing the yield to the individual savers by
doing away with intermediation. In this scenario, borrowing institutions reduced
transaction costs due to reduced asymmetry of information. The savers increased their
yields by taking on the risks themselves - by diversifying their savings across such
institutional borrowers. The trend was towards disintermediation in terms of actual
pooling and disbursal of cash. Though there would not be a total withdrawal of
institutions in the traditional forms of intermediation, the role was being redefined.
So banking institutions are slowly converting themselves into providers of
information and alternative channels. The increase in fee based activities and a
concurrent reduction in income from fund based activities is a trend that can be seen
very clearly in some of the western models. We thus see a redefinition of roles going
on, when the level of asymmetry of information reduces. In a mature model where
technology enables storage and retrieval of large data, the function of intermediation
could be as represented in Figure-3.
Figure 3 About Here
Trust and Transaction Costs
We can safely say that trust - which could also be a function of increased information
has significant impact on transaction costs - particularly related to documentation and
delay in procuring the loan. When levels of trust is high, the decisions are taken9
immediately and the documentation formality will be minimal. That is the reason why
we see that the money lender in a village can be rightly termed as an ATM (expanded
as Any Time Moneylender!). As institutions get more and more formal, the trust will
have to be converted from interpersonal trust to institutional trust - which requires
recording, storing and retrieval of information - this might increase transaction costs
but would certainly make the transactions sustainable and repetitive in nature.
We also need to recognise the limit to growth within which information and trust
could be used on the basis of personal knowledge. If we look at most self-help groups
that are formed in the country, we would find a certain amount of homogeneity in
them. This is not a matter of setting right the caste system, or ridding the community
based divide. It is infact leveraging the current social structure to the maximum extent
to reduce information asymmetry and foster trust. However, there is the danger when
this is a formula taken up by the State for replication. This would assume that groups
could be formed as a result of voluntary contract between individuals who make a
rational calculation that co-operation is in their long-term self-interest, and may have
the danger of assuming that group formation is not culture-dependent. However, it is
said that the most effective organisations are based on communities of shared ethical
values (Fukuyama, 1995).
We have seen in the above structures that informal institutions and groups manage
close knit groups and communities much better than formal institutions.  However the
opposite is quite true of formal institutions where memory is based on records and not
on the basis of interpersonal transactions. Here the institutions are capable of
managing diversity. Infact the strength of formal institutions is essentially because
they are able to manage diversity and reduce the covariance risk.  This also gives
scope for rapid scalability and replicability.
As we see institutions achieving certain scale, the political economy of the activity
dictates that they go beyond interpersonal trust and move towards systems and
procedures. These are represented by contracts, clauses of the contracts and behaviour
arising out of such clauses. As long as the standardised clauses are adhered to, there is
systemic trust and the institution goes on. For a salaried person to get a loan for a two-
wheeler, it is now not necessary to personally know any lender. With organisational10
systems procedures and learning, such products are now standardised in urban India.
Such phenomenon is to happen in rural India, but it does not seem far off, given the
right economies of scale and volumes.11
Figure 1: Role of traditional institutions of intermediation
Traditional large financial institution
doing intermediation.
-pooling of information
-pooling of cash and resources
-pooling of risks
Transaction costs pertain to
-collection of information
-monitoring of adverse behaviour
-costs of processing and maintaining
buffer between savers and borrowers
Large number of individual
savers - no direct access to
individual borrowers,
seeking outlet for parking
current flows for future
Large number of individual
























Traditional large financial institution
doing intermediation.
-unit of dealing - group
-pooling of residual cash and lending
for incremental borrowing
-padding of risks - as risks are taken
at the secondary level
Transaction costs pertain to dealing
with group as a unit and therefore
reduced per rupee transaction costs.
High multiplier effect.13
Figure 3 Role of institutions of intermediation in mature societies where
technology bridges the information asymmetry gap.




Large number of borrowers, might
directly borrow from the retail savers if
the amount is large enough to bypass
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Intermediary institutions
also act as collection
agents on behalf of
borrowers - thereby
collecting a fee for the
service, but not assuming
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information
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High level of information on
the counterparty and
therefore high degree of
trust
Minimal documentation, usually
word of mouth. Negligible or
zero out-of-pocket expenses.
Negligible processing time for
transactions.
Break of relationships - increase
in documentation in case of
future transactions. However,













on loans dependent on
local conditions and risk
profile of the borrower –
builds in the cost on
inherent risk of non-
willful default. Threshold
on savings – low.
High degree of information,
transactions largely based
on trust. Lender is operating
in a limited market where
information is personally
stored without formal
recording in books. Very
High covariance risk.
Minimal documentation.
Negligible or zero out of pocket
expenses. Negligible processing
time for transactions. Since there
is a premium on information
(there will be only a few people
who know the borrower and also
have the resources to lend),
interest tends to be high.
Flexibility very high.
Drastic action in case of wilful
default. In case of non-wilful
default, the rent is extracted by a
further loan and making the
borrower more dependent on this
particular source and charging













High levels of information
and trust because of
homogeneity and access to
each other within the group.
Moderate Documentation - more
for the needs of accounts
keeping and external reporting
than for a decision on disbursal.
Low transaction costs, low
flexibility because of competing
needs of different members.
Overall costs vary widely.
If the breach of trust (wilful
default) is an isolated case, there
would be a tendency to regroup.

























Moderate to High level of
information – used effectively
in institutions having
significant member stake
(Agrawal et al, 1994) Used
detrimentally where high
external 'subsidy' funds are
poured in.
Transaction costs have a potential to
be low, but are usually not.
Information recorded more for
external reporting than decision
making. Since the funds are cheap,
there is excessive rent seeking, therby
getting total transaction costs similar
to that of informal channels.
Rampant breach of trust in most
institutions at both levels -
Willful default and breach of
trust of individual with the
institution. No consequential
action on willful default leading
to breach of trust by the
institution against 'good'
borrowers. Effect: rampant












usually seen as an
obligation.
Level of information is low,
because of aspects relating to
continuity of the persons at
the cutting edge. Degree of
trust also low leading to
excessive documentation and
collateral based lending.
However a high degree of
trust is usually reposed by the
saver when the issue of
deposits come up.
Nominal cost of loan is moderate. But
documentation requirements,
inspection, monitoring the usage - all
high. Procedures are inflexible and
elaborate to suit internal controls of
the lending institution. Usually time
consuming. This leads to very high
transaction costs (delay or corruption)
making it comparable to any other
expensive sources in the market.
No effective action on breach of
trust by willful default.
Excessive documentation makes
the transactions impersonal and
there is no effective mechanism
of converting the documentation
into encashable collateral.17
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